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Feature Article 
PROSPECTS FOR LOWLAND AIRPORTS AHD AIR SERVICES 
Jim Stevens 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
I t i s widely accepted t h a t Scot land 
suffers from an over-provision of airport 
services. This i s particularly acute in 
the case of the three Lowland a i rpor ts 
where, in 1984-85, 4.55 million passengers 
u t i l i s ed terminal f a c i l i t i e s wi th an 
estimated capacity of 7.25 mppa. This 
ou t tu rn of 63% capac i ty u t i l i s a t i o n 
conceals marked variations. In the last 
fiscal year Prestwick's terminal building 
operated at 15.5% capacity whilst Glasgow 
and Edinburgh operated at 79-5% and 76.5? 
respectively. 
The p r ime r e a s o n fo r t h e unequa l 
d i s t r ibu t ion of bus iness between the 
Lowland a i rpo r t s i s the policy of market 
segmentat ion adopted by success ive 
administrat ions. Under national a i r 
s e r v i c e a g r e e m e n t s . P r e s t w i c k i s 
designated as the sole Scottish gateway 
for transatlantic services. In December 
1982, B r i t i s h Midland Airways (BMA) 
attempted to overturn th i s policy by 
s e e k i n g an a i r t r a n s p o r t l i c e n c e 
permitting a Manchester-Glasgow-New York 
service. This was subsequently granted 
by the UK industry 's regulatory body, the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). However, 
Prestwick's owners, the Br i t i sh Airports 
Authority (BAA) appealed against th i s 
decision to the Secretary of State for 
Transport, Mr Nicholas Ridley, who upheld 
the BAA appeal in May 1984. Mr Ridley 
was dissatisfied with some of the issues 
raised by t h i s episode and ordered a 
review of the present Lowlands a i rpor ts 
policy to be conducted by a working party 
consisting of Scott ish Office, Treasury, 
Department of Transport, BAA and CAA 
representativ es. 
The working party reported belatedly in 
March 1985. Their broad conclusion was 
t h a t " the balance of f i n a n c i a l and 
economic considerations would point to a 
change in po l icy which concent ra ted 
operations a t Glasgow and Edinburgh". 
However, a set of wider offset t ing costs 
were ident i f ied and the working party 
paved the way for the retent ion of the 
s ta tus quo by invit ing f inal decision to 
be taken on the b a s i s of " p o l i t i c a l 
priori t ies" . 
Thus, in early April Mr Ridley announced 
that "the Government have decided that for 
the present there should be no change in 
the pol icy under which Pres twick i s 
designated as the gateway for long haul 
a i r s e r v i c e s to and from Scotland". 
Referr ing to the poor opera t ing and 
financial performance of the airport, Mr 
Ridley continued: "if however a change in 
the fortunes of Prestwick does not come 
about by 1989, the decision to maintain 
the e x i s t i n g po l icy w i l l have to be 
reconsidered". Thus, the Government 
decided to maintain the present t r a f f i c 
d i s t r ibu t ion arrangements for Scotland. 
Activity at both Edinburgh and Glasgow 
continues to be restricted to domestic and 
short haul in ternat ional scheduled and 
charter t r a f f i c whilst Prestwick remains 
v i r t u a l l y the so le S c o t t i s h a i r p o r t 
allowed to handle transatlantic business. 
In June 1984 the Government published i t s 
White Paper on Airports Policy in which i t 
formalised these Scottish arrangements and 
outlined proposals for the privatisation 
of the BAA in 1987. I t i s f a i r to say 
that neither adherents of change nor 
supporters of Prestwick are satisfied with 
this outcome and the decision has not been 
greeted en thus ias t i ca l ly in Scot land. 
This has prompted a sp i r i ted defence of 
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the policy by Government minis ters . I t 
i s Mr Ridley's view that "our proposals 
g ive Pres twick a new oppor tuni ty to 
thrive" and Mr Younger's contention that 
"there is no reason why Prestwick airport 
should not have a rosy future". Mr 
Younger asserted that "we now have a 
blueprint for development and for airport 
policy for a long time ahead. Now that a 
lengthy period of uncertainty is over, le t 
us get on wi th the job of t a l k i n g 
Prestwick up for the good of everyone." 
I t i s our view that "uncertainty" i s not 
at the root of Prestwick's troubles and 
t h a t " t a lk ing Pres twick up" has not 
succeeded and i s un l ike ly to make a 
m a t e r i a l impact on the fo r tunes of 
S c o t l a n d ' s t r a n s a t l a n t i c gateway. 
P r e s t w i c k A i r p o r t s u f f e r s from 
fundamentally insoluble problems and i t s 
ex i s t ence i s th rea tened by. and i s 
inconsistent with. Government pol ic ies 
towards air transport. 
The prospects for Prestwick airport 
Any understanding of the d i f f i cu l t i e s 
faced by P r e s t w i c k r e q u i r e s an 
app rec i a t i on of the l i b e r a l s tance 
underpinning cu r r en t c i v i l a v i a t i o n 
policy. Internat ional a i r - t ranspor t i s 
closely regulated by bilateral air-service 
agreements (ASA's) which determine the 
nature and extent of competition on routes 
between the signatory nations. In many 
cases, only one airl ine from each country 
i s permitted to supply a i r services and 
often price se t t ing , quantity restraints 
and revenue pooling are called for in 
order to protect the less viable carrier. 
This had led to a high price-high quality 
service designed to cater for business and 
commercial interest at the expense of mass 
transport opportunities. 
The Government i s committed in practice as 
well as principle to re-negotiating ASA's 
to accommodate free access and in greater 
compet i t ion . In theory , such de-
r e g u l a t i o n w i l l lead to p ressu re on 
airline prices and costs and carriers will 
require to become more ef f ic ient through 
the e l i m i n a t i o n of l o s s making and 
marginal services. In such circumstances 
a i r l i ne s wi l l tend to operate through 
major hub a i rpor t s whose i n t e r l i n i n g 
opportunities present the prospect of 
higher load factors. Thus, liberalisation 
w i l l favour a i r p o r t s whose l oca t i on 
provides the basis for generating a viable 
network of services. 
Deregulation i s a fact for t r ansa t l an t i c 
services as the Bermuda I I agreement i s 
l ibe ra l i s ing in both intent and effect . 
This has led to the growth of low cost, 
high density operations such as Peoples 
Express, Virgin Atlantic and the ill-fated 
Laker Airways. Price competition is keen 
and there have been periodic a l legat ions 
of unfair pract ices by national ca r r ie r s 
who have cross-subsidised predatory prices 
with the monopoly r e n t s from non-
l ibe ra l i sed operations. As predicted, 
operators have pruned marginal services as 
evidenced by the BA decision to withdraw 
from both Manchester and Prestwick in 
1981-
In the case of Prestwick, no return of 
ca r r i e r s i s l ike ly because Prestwick 
suffers locat ional disadvantages which 
prevent i t developing as a hub ai rpor t . 
First, Prestwick has the fourth smallest 
catchment area of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a i rport in Western Europe. Secondly, 
Prestwick i s poorly connected to major 
Scottish centres of population through 
exist ing road and r a i l infras t ructure . 
However, i t is not clear that improvements 
in these amenities would substant ia l ly 
a l t e r the prospects of the a i rpor t and 
Strathclyde Region should be wary of 
committing scarce capi tal resources to 
clearly unprofitable r a i l hal t schemes. 
Thirdly, Prestwick has the handicap of 
being an air transport cul de sac without 
a network of domestic and European feeder 
services. Such a network ex i s t s in 
Scotland but i s bu i l t around the more 
conveniently located a i rpor ts a t Glasgow 
and Edinburgh. Not only does t h i s 
prevent similar f a c i l i t i e s developing at 
Prestwick but the existence of these 
networks brings Prestwick into di rect 
competition for t r ansa t l an t i c business 
with London, Manchester and major European 
hubs where the service is more frequent. 
Thus, actual and potential ca r r i e r s from 
Prestwick face st iff competition from BA 
and BCal whose wide ranging marketing 
operations are designed to tempt Scottish 
t r ansa t l an t i c demand to patronise thei r 
domestic s e r v i c e s and i n t e r l i n e at 
English and Continental a i rpor t s . In 
short , the exist ing t ra f f ic distribution 
policy does not maintain complementary 
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roles for Lowland a i rpor t s since Glasgow 
and Edinburgh actual ly do compete for 
Scotland's transatlantic demand. 
Transat lant ic business a t both Heathrow 
and Gatwick has recovered sharply in the 
past f i sca l year ref lec t ing favourable 
exchange rates and the rapid emergence of 
a i r t ransport from the recession of the 
early 1980's. Prestwick has fai led to 
bene f i t from these recent favourable 
conditions. In the 1984-85 f i sca l year 
the number of terminal passengers declined 
by 7.0% to 232,000 following a s l igh t 
increase in the previous period. The 
dec l ine i s l e s s marked in scheduled 
services than on charters who compete more 
directly for leisure business with the low 
price carriers. Terminal passengers are 
currently a t about 60$ of the levels 
experienced in the 1970's and scheduled 
passengers remain well below half of the 
number using the a i rpor t in the mid and 
late parts of the las t decade. Prestwick 
continues to lose air transport movements. 
These are at present only one third as 
numerous as ten years ago. This collapse 
has been largely offset by the growth in 
the movements of General Aviation traffic. 
The throughput of cargo and mail showed 
some signs of recovery this year, although 
these are a t r e l a t ive ly low tonnages 
compared with the l a t e 1970's. The 
financial position has improved s l igh t ly 
with the operating loss down by £600,000 
to £2.8 million largely reflecting reduced 
depreciation provisions. Since i t i s 
questionable whether further scope i s 
a v a i l a b l e fo r improvements though 
decreases in c o s t s , any s u b s t a n t i a l 
reduction in losses requires to be found 
on the income side. There are three 
widely canvassed remedies: 
Reduced uncertainty: I t i s the view of 
bo th Government and t h e BAA t h a t 
uncertainty as to the airport's future has 
resulted in Prestwick failing to improve 
i t s performance in the face of ostensibly 
favourable condit ions. Our analysis 
denies such propositions and suggests that 
i t i s the permanently more competitive 
transatlantic market in conjunction with 
poor l o c a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that 
provide the insurmountable constraints to 
recovery. However, i f uncertainty is a 
major d i f f i cu l ty , the recent Review and 
White Paper have changed nothing and 
solved l i t t l e . F i r s t , the a i rpor t i s 
only guaranteed un t i l 1989. Secondly, 
the BAA i s to be privat ised in 1987 and 
there i s no indication that the Government 
wi l l maintain the f inal say over the 
closure of the aerodrome as the BAA and 
most Scott ish MP's desire . Given that 
one purpose of privatisation is to reduce 
such polit ical intervention and given that 
Prestwick continues to d iv ide pub l i c 
opin ion, i t seems un l ike ly t h a t the 
Government would wish to re ta in such an 
i n c o n s i s t e n t and t h a n k l e s s r o l e . 
However, i n i t i a l l y , the Government wi l l 
maintain a large strategic holding which 
could be used to thwart early closure. 
In addit ion, the Government could refuse 
air transport licences for Glasgow routes 
and planning permission for physical 
expansions a t other Lowland a i rpor t s . 
Thus, the Government could force a 
privatised BAA to persist with Prestwick. 
Again this would hardly be consistent with 
t h e e f f i c i e n c y o b j e c t i v e s of 
denationalisation. 
I t appears , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t un less 
P r e s t w i c k ' s pe r fo rmance improves 
substantially, the shareholders of BAA pic 
wi l l have every incentive to close the 
a i rpor t and r ea l i s e the capi ta l gains 
a r i s i n g from the reduced l o s s e s and 
i n c r e a s e d u t i l i s a t i o n of e x i s t i n g 
fac i l i t i es . 
The Review of Lowlands Airports Policy 
endeavoured to demonstrate that under high 
and intermediate growth of demand i t was 
not financially worthwhile for the BAA to 
close Glasgow. Whilst several of the 
assumptions can be questioned there is an 
extremely low p r o b a b i l i t y of ever 
achieving e i ther intermediate or high 
demand. Only the advent of new operations 
such as those proposed by Highland Express 
can hope to ra i se ac t iv i ty and resu l t in 
net benefits to the owners from sustaining 
Prestwick. 
Highland Express: This airline proposes 
to develop Prestwick as i t s base for 
t r a n s a t l a n t i c f l i g h t s originat ing a t 
Birmingham. Maastricht and Stansted. In 
i t s original plans the company envisaged a 
progressive build up to 140,000 terminal 
passengers a t Prestwick with a further 
400.000 t r ans i t ing to and from the above 
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mentioned a i rpor t s . The company has 
recently revised these projections upwards 
in the light of the sustained recovery in 
the transatlantic market. 
The Highland Express strategy is based on 
cheap fares to tap the younger end of the 
l e i sure market and on a clear Scottish 
image designed to exploit the potentially 
vast 'ki th and kin1 demand. The 'youth' 
market i s already well catered for by 
d i rec t services at Gatwick and i t i s not 
c l ea r how wel l i n d i r e c t f l i g h t s via 
Prestwick wi l l fare. Potential ly both 
Stansted and Birmingham serve a different 
catchment area to Gatwick and at present 
Highland Express would have the area to 
i t s e l f . However, Peoples Express have 
applied for a route licence to operate 
transatlantic from Stansted and this must 
ca l l into question the v iab i l i ty of the 
Highland Express plans for that particular 
market. The 'ki th and kin' business i s 
currently served by Air Canada and North 
West Orient at Prestwick, by charters and 
i n d i r e c t l y v i a London and o t h e r 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r p o r t s . As already 
indicated, any new services would face 
s t i f f competition from existing carriers 
whose marketing organisations are adept at 
captur ing both d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t 
Scottish transatlantic demand. 
The proposed numbers of t e rmina l 
passengers envisaged by Highland Express 
wi l l be d i f f i cu l t to a t ta in and i t i s a 
moot point whether the new a i r l i n e wi l l 
a t t r a c t the f i n a n c i a l and marketing 
resources which wil l be required in i t s 
growth phase. I t i s also likely that the 
new a i r l i ne would a t t r a c t custom from 
existing operators at Prestwick and there 
is tentative evidence to suggest that this 
could undermine the profitability of the 
two remaining scheduled carriers. North 
West Orient estimate that 20% of the i r 
demand is business-orientated and i t i s 
probable t h a t Air Canada i s broadly 
similar. Thus, Highland Express will be 
competing with both these carriers for the 
bulk of t h e i r a lready i n s u b s t a n t i a l 
business. 
Analysis of terminal passengers per air-
transport movement reveals that the ratios 
for Prestwick are substant ial ly below 
those for Heathrow and Gatwick on North 
American r o u t e s . Al lowing for 
differences in aircraft mix, this suggests 
that operating transatlantic flights from 
Prestwick may be re la t ive ly f ragi le in 
financial terms. There i s , therefore, a 
suspicion that i f Highland Express were 
successful i t would j eopa rd i s e the 
ope ra t ions of the e x i s t i n g ca r r i e r s . 
This would not provide any l a s t i n g 
security for the airport. 
As yet Highland Express has obtained 
neither finance for aeroplanes nor a route 
licence for i t s operations and i t i s s t i l l 
not apparent that the a i r l i ne wi l l be 
ready for the revised 1986 launch. The 
Highland Express venture is innovative and 
r i sky but i t s e f f ec t on Pres twick ' s 
f i n a n c i a l performance i s unce r t a in . 
Given that BAA estimate that an additional 
100,000 terminal passengers would result 
in the a i r p o r t breaking even, i t i s 
l i k e l y t h a t a succesful outcome for 
Highland Express will be necessary but not 
suff icient to save Prestwick within a 
privat ised BAA where higher returns on 
capital will be required. I t i s probable 
that a prosperous Highland Express wi l l 
ul t imately drive away one or both of the 
exist ing scheduled car r ie r s because in a 
l ibe ra l operating environment there i s 
simply not much likelihood that Lowland 
Scotland can support the required volume 
of t r ansa t l an t i c services to profitably 
sus t a in t h r e e c a r r i e r s competing for 
seasonal le i sure demand. In any event, 
t h e r e i s no way t h a t S c o t t i s h 
t r a n s a t l a n t i c demand can j u s t i f y a 
separate a i rport which i s what current 
policy effectively dictates. 
Twin-engined aircraft: The poss ib i l i ty 
that the new generation of wide-bodied 
twin-engined j e t s such as the Boeing 767 
will be licensed to fly transatlantic has 
implications for both Prestwick and other 
Lowland a i rpor t s . The internat ional 
c iv i l aviation community remains divided 
on issues of safety but i t seems l ikely 
t h a t , fol lowing the s tance taken by 
Canada, these planes wil l be in service 
over the Atlantic sooner rather than 
l a t e r . The economics of these a i rc ra f t 
favour a marginal dest inat ion and could 
result in increased frequency of services 
at Prestwick, thus countering the argument 
of the previous section. In addition, 
safe ty requi rements may s t rengthen 
Pres twick ' s ro l e as a d ivers ionary 
airport. 
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Whilst such o p e r a t i o n s provide an 
oppor tun i ty for Pres twick they a l so 
present a th rea t . Such services could 
e a s i l y be based a t Glasgow without 
implying s u b s t a n t i a l expendi tu re on 
inf ras t ruc ture . This would make any 
closure option more attractive to BAA. 
SUtURY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main thrust of t h i s paper i s that 
l i be r a l i s a t i on of a i r - se rv ices tends to 
favour airports where a strong and viable 
route network ex i s t s or i s capable of 
be ing d e v e l o p e d . The p o l i c y of 
segmenting Scot t ish long and short haul 
t r a f f i c in i t s e l f would deny Prestwick 
such development. In addition, Prestwick 
serves a market which i s only barely 
capable of suppor t ing t r a n s a t l a n t i c 
s e r v i c e s . In t h e more l i b e r a l 
environment Prestwick is not capable of 
being "talked up" and indeed the Review 
makes the l im i t a t i ons of such a strategy 
very clear. 
I t i s , therefore, fundamentally wrong to 
argue tha t Prestwick's development i s 
being restricted by uncertainty. 
However, even if t h i s were t rue , the 
Review of Lowland Airport Policy and 
subsequent White Paper actually add to the 
u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding the a i rpor t . 
Similarly, the advent of twin-engined je t s 
cuts both ways. These offer no definite 
salvation for the Ayrshire airport. Thus 
Highland Express provides Prestwick's las t 
fa in t hope of escaping closure in 1989-
Given our analysis , i t i s unlikely that 
Highland Express can expand bus iness 
s u f f i c i e n t l y to make the a i r p o r t an 
a t t r ac t i ve proposition to the private 
sector. There seems l i t t l e prospect that 
Highland Express can galvanise Prestwick 
in t h e way t h a t P e o p l e s Express 
transformed Newark. The twin problems of 
s t rong competing hubs and poor and 
seasonal local demand deny such optimism. 
Thus Prestwick i s a casualty of the very 
market forces the Government i s committed 
to extending. To continue to prop up 
Prestwick subsequent to p r iva t i sa t ion 
would c o n t r a d i c t t h e fundamenta l 
objectives of the policy. For industries 
with s t ruc tura l problems, pr iva t i sa t ion 
implies more than a painless t ransfer of 
assets between sectors . Infras t ructure 
developed under a public sector regime may 
not prove robust to most exacting private 
sector c r i t e r i a . Given the Government's 
e x p l i c i t f r e e marke t s t a n c e , t h e 
statements by Mr Younger and Mr Ridley are 
misleading and inconsistent. I t is only a 
matter of time before the market real i t ies 
overtake the empty rhetoric and the costs 
become apparen t . The Government i s 
committed to c r e a t i n g a world where 
Prestwick airport has l i t t l e future and in 
the 1990's transatlantic services will be 
based at Abbotsinch. 
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